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  In the United States, the explicit representation of workforce interests in strategic 
decision-making processes of corporations is rare.  Participation in strategic decisions – 
those that affect the basic direction of the company – is unusual even when workforce 
interests are represented collectively through unions.  In this chapter, we consider U.S. 
labor-management experiments with two institutions through which strategic 
participation for unions might be realized: negotiated union-management partnership 
agreements, and union representation on corporate boards. 
  These types of institutions for strategic participation have emerged from private 
sector initiatives, without the support of public policy.  The ad hoc character of these U.S. 
initiatives stands in contrast to the legally mandated works councils, and provisions for 
workforce representation on corporate boards of directors (or “codetermination”), which 
are characteristic of many European countries.  Europeans are in the process of 
constructing similar legally supported institutions for a united Europe.  In the U.S., 
however, there are no legal structures that provide American workers with strategic 
participation at either the level of the establishment or the corporate board. 
Understanding the development of these institutions in the U.S. requires consideration of 
the variety of attempts by unions and management to engage strategic decisions jointly. 
This chapter examines union experiences with partnership agreements and with 
board representation.  We begin by considering the problem of corporate governance and 
reviewing the rationale for strategic partnerships. The next section discusses the 
prevalence of such partnerships in the U.S. The following sections report on specific 
strategic partnerships and on union involvement in corporate boards of directors. The   2
chapter concludes with discussions of the challenges and dilemmas facing unions should 
they seek partnerships at the strategic level. 
 
Corporate Governance in the U.S. 
  Corporate governance is generally understood to refer to the legal and 
organizational structures that govern the relationship between corporate executives and 
the shareholders that are the ultimate owners of the physical capital of the company. 
Through corporate governance structures, firms make decisions about investments in 
plant and equipment, levels of staff and deployment of workers, location of operations, 
the allocation of resources, and the distribution of earnings.  In theories of the firm that 
dominate U.S. legal and economic discourse, the purpose of corporate governance 
structures is to align the interests of corporate executives with those of the shareholders, 
and to assure that managers act in shareholders’ best interests (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
  Shareholder-based theories reduce the relationship between owners and workers 
to an employment contract that specifies the wage – work effort bargain. In general, U.S. 
laws follow these theories: workers have no legally guaranteed rights to participation in 
corporate governance structures, or to have their interests taken into account when 
strategic decisions are made. While some states have allowed directors to consider other 
stakeholders (Orts 1992), most American corporate boards of directors have a primary 
fiduciary responsibility to the companies’ shareholders.  Shareholders in turn have legally 
recognized rights to be represented on corporate boards of directors, and to have the 
assets in which they have invested protected from misuse or misappropriation by the 
careless or opportunistic behavior of managers.   3
  Shareholder-focused conceptions of the firm, and their supporting legal structures, 
sharply differentiate decision-making managers from workers who do not make 
decisions. Such differentiation does not reflect contemporary practice, for effective 
management of modern enterprises requires more than the specification of a wage-effort 
bargain.  Workers’ engagement in decision-making began on a reasonably large scale in 
the U.S. with Quality of Work Life (QWL) programs in the 1970s (Appelbaum and Batt 
1994; Heckscher 1997).  Subsequent competitive pressures and technological 
developments led firms to adopt self-directed work teams and an array of high 
performance workplace practices that facilitated worker participation in operational 
decisions at the work site. These practices began slowly in the 1980s and became 
increasingly prevalent in the 1990s (Lawler, Ledford and Morhman 1989; Lawler, 
Mohrman and Ledford 1992; Osterman 1994; Freeman and Rogers 1995; Lawler, 
Mohrman and Ledford 1995; Gittleman, Horrigan and Joyce 1998; Osterman 2000) 
At the operational level, the benefits of involvement typically outweigh costs 
associated with joint decision-making.  Empirical evidence demonstrates improvements 
in productivity, quality, delivery times, and even financial performance as a result of 
worker participation in operational decisions of the enterprise (Katz, Kochan and Weber 
1985; MacDuffie 1995; Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi 1997; Appelbaum et al. 2000; 
Rubinstein 2000). (Becker and Gerhart (1996), Ichniowski et al. (1996), and Baker 
(1999) also review the evidence).  These studies suggest that corporate management has 
an interest in implementing what have been termed “high performance work systems” 
Workers in high performance work systems also generally find that their jobs are more   4
intrinsically satisfying and rewarding – more challenging and able to make better use of 
their skills (Appelbaum et al. 2000). 
  At decision-making levels above that of the day-to-day workplace, however, 
participation and partnership typically remain the prerogative of management. Managers 
have resisted calls for joint decision-making forums for decisions that might require 
downsizing, divesting of parts or whole divisions, or shifting operations to new locations 
or to other (often nonunion) subsidiaries, for example.  Shareholders, similarly, may 
oppose decision-making processes that make it more difficult for owners to capture rents 
associated with innovations in technology, work systems, products or services. 
Managerial opposition to strategic participation by unions has often been strident (for an 
example, see Loughran (1985)). 
Traditional collective bargaining by unions, within the existing framework of 
labor law, provides some constraints on managerial discretion.  Unions have legally 
protected rights to negotiate over the effects of strategic decisions (though not the 
decisions themselves), and collective bargaining creates governance structures within 
firms that affect the distribution of resources, including the extent to which the firm’s 
revenue is shared with the workforce, and the ways in which pay is allocated across 
workers.  Unions may also negotiate to establish grievance procedures that provide a 
voice mechanism for workers who feel they have been treated unfairly by management, 
and for job rules and employment security arrangements that limit employers’ ability to 
hire and fire at will. 
Union leaders have been historically reluctant to involve themselves any more 
deeply in strategic decision-making than is called for under traditional collective   5
bargaining.  Such involvement might require them to assume responsibility for the 
performance of the company, or to participate in business decisions that may have 
disparate effects on different groups of union members, and labor leaders have not 
embraced such a role.  Thomas Donahue, then AFL-CIO Secretary- Treasurer, 
summarized the traditional viewpoint in a 1976 speech: 
Because American unions have won equality at the bargaining table, we have not 
sought it in corporate boardrooms. We do not seek to be a partner in management 
-- to be, most likely, the junior partner in success and the senior partner in failure. 
We do not want to blur in any way the distinctions between the respective roles of 
management and labor in the plant. We guard our independence fiercely -- 
independent of government, independent of any political party, and independent 
of management. 
 
The rationale for strategic partnerships 
Collective bargaining has long been the primary vehicle through which unions 
have sought to protect the long-term interests of their members; high-performance work 
systems, coupled with union representation, may help workers and firms discover futher 
“mutual gains” in the workplace (Kochan and Osterman 1994). Even as new work 
practices diffused over the 1980s and 1990s, however, some union leaders came to 
believe that neither employee involvement nor collective bargaining provided unions 
with the means to deal with the turbulence associated with increasingly mobile capital, 
global competition, and corporate restructuring. For example, some evidence on the 
diffusion of new work practices suggests that such practices were not typically 
accompanied by provisions for employment security (Osterman 1994), and that firms that 
adopted them were in fact more likely than others to lay off workers in the 1990s 
(Osterman 2000).   6
Workers tended to be favorably inclined toward new work systems, but their 
responses were less enthusiastic when reforms were coupled with corporate strategies 
that made jobs more precarious rather than more secure (Hunter, MacDuffie, and Doucet  
forthcoming). Union leaders began to observe that downsizing, outsourcing, and 
reengineering threatened their members even as the high performance work systems they 
had negotiated were delivering higher productivity and quality.  These threats prompted 
more vigorous interest representation through collective bargaining, and more skeptical 
attitudes toward high-performance work systems.  
Some unions also began to seek venues for engaging the strategic decisions 
themselves, looking for influence over the direction of the business, the allocation of 
resources, and the distribution of revenues, and for access to the financial information 
and business records upon which such decisions were based. While risky, these strategic 
partnerships may prove to be popular with union members: the Workplace Representation 
and Participation Survey (Freeman and Rogers 1999) provided some recent evidence that 
union members would support such institutions. Past opposition to such involvement may 
also have been overstated; an earlier survey by Fatehi-Sadeh and Safizadeh (1986), for 
example, showed that Illinois United Auto Workers (UAW) and AFL-CIO officials were 
favorably inclined toward strategic engagement.   
Strategic partnership not only commands some support among workers, but also 
has an underlying economic rationale. This rationale is intensified in the current 
competitive environment, which features both continued downsizing and increasing use 
of high-performance work practices. Workers who invest in firm-specific skills – skills 
that do not transfer easily to other jobs – have a vested interest in the long-term   7
performance of the firm that employs them. Further, high performance workplace 
practices require that workers, in order to participate effectively in operational decision 
making, make large investments in firm-specific skills (Appelbaum and Berg 2000). As 
with investments by shareholders in firm-specific physical capital, the returns to 
investments in these skills are earned over an extended time period as the company 
employs these skills to generate revenue. Should strategic considerations lead companies 
to lay off workers before they have the chance to recover the value of their investments in 
skills, U.S. workers, unlike their counterparts in many European countries, have no 
legally enforceable means to protect their investments.  A role for unions in these 
decisions may therefore enhance the credibility of commitments made by managers, who 
themselves may be employed for relatively short periods and who may have incentives 
focused heavily on short-term performance. 
U.S. firms also enjoy considerable freedom to oppose workers’ right to organize, 
and to move work from union to non-union settings through outsourcing or investment 
strategies. These freedoms provide an important backdrop for the U.S. experiences with 
labor-management partnerships.  On the one hand, because union leaders are centrally 
concerned with preserving union jobs, they have incentives to seek a variety of strategies,   
including partnerships, that might be effective in doing so. On the other hand, continued 
attention to institutional security on the part of the union leaders can distract from other 
issues that might be considered jointly. The ability of managers to walk away from labor-
management relationships, and, in some cases, their demonstrated willingness to do so, 
can erode the mutual trust necessary to make partnerships effective. 
   8
The prevalence of strategic labor-management partnerships 
Gray, Myers, and Myers’s (1999) review of the Bureau of Labor Statistics file on 
contemporary collective bargaining agreements (those expiring between September 1, 
1997 and September 30, 2007, and covering more than 1,000 employees) found that 
nearly 47% of U.S. collective bargaining agreements contained some form of 
“partnership.” In this chapter, we focus on partnerships which include strategic 
engagement: negotiated agreements that provide the union with a voice in high-level 
decisions and with some influence over the governance of the company.  Strategic 
partnerships enable unions to participate along with management in financial planning, in 
determining competitive strategy, and in decisions governing investments, technology, 
and production processes.  
Gray et al. (1999) located the strategic partnerships that we discuss here at one 
end of a cooperation continuum, with modest arrangements (such as language indicating 
the intention of the parties to cooperate) at the other end, and provisions for employee 
involvement and information sharing somewhere between.  A review of the collective 
bargaining agreements showed that strategic partnerships were extremely rare: only 27 of 
1,041 contracts contained provisions for what Gray et al. termed “full partnership”; these 
contracts covered about 200,000 workers. 
The history of some relatively high profile labor-management partnerships, such 
as the one that developed between Xerox and ACTWU (now UNITE) implies that 
strategic partnerships might evolve from shop-floor cooperation as a result of a sort of 
natural progression (see Appelbaum and Batt (1994) for an overview of this case). Gray 
et al. (1999), similarly suggest that partnerships may progress from low levels of   9
cooperation, through more elaborate channels for employee involvement, to full strategic 
partnership. 
We used this premise as a starting point for a small-sample inquiry. In the 
summer of 1999, we surveyed 25 researchers in management, human resource 
administration, industrial relations, and labor studies. Each had published studies 
examining negotiated labor-management cooperation; the studies covered 24 different 
companies.
1 Many of these studies were assessments, negative as well as positive, of 
“high performance workplace” practices implemented through negotiated agreements. 
Our survey focused on the extent to which negotiated cooperation, or lower-level 
partnerships, served as a precursor to subsequent involvement of the union in strategic 
decisions. Because the researchers were well positioned to provide a perspective with a 
longitudinal element, we asked them to describe the evolution of cooperation in the 
union-management relationship, and the extent to which strategic partnership had 
developed, emerged, or been negotiated.  
We received usable responses from 12 researchers.  Of these, five researchers 
reported that the union-management partnerships they studied led to no strategic 
participation for the union. At an information technology manufacturing company, for 
example, a partnership formed between corporate executives at company headquarters 
and the top levels of the union resulted in no high-level joint decision-making at the plant 
being studied.  Similarly, a telephone company that had negotiated more cooperative 
                                                           
1 The companies include GTE, NYNEX, NUMMI, AT&T, Lucent, NCR, Saturn, Chrysler, US West, Pac 
Bell, GM Linden, ALCOA, Levi Strauss, Xerox, Harrison Radiator, Ford-Wayne ISA, Chrysler Canada, 
US Steel, Bethlehem Steel, Inland Steel, and companies in semiconductors, trucking, airlines, and steel that 
wished to remain unidentified.   10
work practices with its union “never approached [strategic involvement],” according to 
the researcher who studied it. 
Three researchers reported on companies and unions that negotiated cooperative 
relations, but not strategic partnerships, with the relationship blurring into discussions 
and consultation on strategic issues. The cooperative relation between the local union and 
management at one auto plant, for example, was described by a researcher as based on 
information sharing on business and operational matters. However, the relationship was 
never meant to be a strategic partnership. On the contrary, the researcher reported that 
“both parties jealously guard their rights and their obligations to their respective 
constituencies.” This sort of partnership included communication, trust, consultation, and 
advance notice of changes; there was, however, no shared decision-making or union 
involvement in decisions relating to financial planning, investments, pricing, competitive 
strategies, or production processes.  
Another researcher characterized an auto agreement similarly: “Dialogue is not 
the same as negotiation. Above all, it doesn’t authorize any claim by the union to a 
legitimate place at the table. … In my opinion, management has been savvy and 
consistent in its efforts to promote worker participation (and not merely symbolic 
participation) while at the same time limiting the union to a fairly traditional role.” Here, 
the union was informed and consulted prior to implementation of management decisions, 
but rarely involved in joint decision-making. For example, the company had already 
decided to adopt participatory workplace practices before it began any discussion with 
the union. It then involved the workforce extensively in the implementation of these 
practices.   11
  The remaining four researchers reported on full strategic labor-management 
agreements that accompanied other kinds of cooperation at five companies.  Differences 
in the origins and evolution of these agreements are instructive. In the steel industry, 
strategic participation was driven by the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) 
national bargaining agenda (discussed in more detail below). The agenda includes a 
commitment to build strategic labor-management partnerships wherever possible in order 
to gain increased control over company decision-making. Researchers reported that 
companies in the steel and aluminum industries entered into strategic partnership 
agreements with the USWA because they needed to introduce new workplace practices in 
order to meet heightened global competition. The companies sought to redesign work 
processes, to increase discretionary effort, and by doing so to improve operational 
performance at the plant level; this required union participation.  In practice, these 
partnerships have been implemented differently across companies and even across plants 
in the same company. 
  Telecommunications researchers described a contrasting case.  Competition from 
non-union companies led one large company to enter into strategic partnership with the 
Communication Workers of America (CWA). The company wanted union support for 
favorable legislation and administrative rulings domestically as well as union help when 
it sought approval to participate in a foreign telephone company. This, it believed, would 
help the company compete and grow; the union supported these efforts because they were 
likely to result in more union jobs. The union made company neutrality in union 
organizing drives and card check recognition for the union key requirements for its 
participation in a strategic alliance at this and other telecom companies. According to the   12
researchers, “The striking aspect of the union security clauses is that while the union 
began to demand [them] soon after divestiture, it met with limited success until the 
companies began needing union support in the regulatory arena. … The union supported 
their efforts in return for some guarantees for union and job security. … The union won 
the union security clauses by linking regulatory and collective bargaining activities.”  
Researchers suggested, however, that while CWA is involved in an alliance with the 
company about strategic issues, unlike the steelworkers, the union does not necessarily 
see shared decision-making authority as a key piece of its bargaining agenda. 
Our survey of researchers is consistent with the data that show that strategic 
labor-management partnerships are rare.  Even in cases where labor and management 
made commitments to cooperation at other levels, strategic involvement was unusual and 
did not typically follow other kinds of cooperation as part of an unfolding process.  The 
survey suggested further that where such partnerships exist, they need not necessarily 
have evolved out of earlier experiences with negotiated cooperative relationships.  
Rather, there are a variety of paths to strategic partnership. We turn our attention to these 
paths next. 
  
The shape of strategic engagement: negotiated partnerships 
Some union leaders and companies have established strategic partnerships 
through negotiation. Below we consider in more detail the content of these partnerships, 
as well as the reasons that different unions and firms agreed to construct them.  We do so 
with reference to four different partnerships, negotiated by unions in electrical 
contracting, telecommunications, steel, and manufacturing.    13
Two primary kinds of interests – company growth (or stability), and new work 
practices --  have brought companies and their workers’ unions together in strategic 
partnerships, Below we consider examples of each. First, as competitive pressures 
continue to intensify, companies and unions may find that they have a common interest in 
seeing the company grow. Growth of the company and expansion of union jobs, when 
these are mutually agreed upon goals, can be advanced by a partnership relationship. The 
cooperation of the union can help management preserve or increase market share, while 
the union sees involvement in defense or expansion of market share as an opportunity to 
protect and promote union jobs.  
Second, at many companies increased competition also leads managers to 
introduce participatory management and high performance workplace practices.  
Strategic involvement can complement these practices. An active union role in decisions 
about workplace practices provides workers with a further voice and a forum for 
addressing the context in which the organization introduces new practices. Unions, like 
companies, have an interest in the adoption of practices that contribute to organizational 
viability and success. Mutual respect for both company and union goals can also be 
advanced by partnership relationships. 
 
Cooperative Efforts in the Electrical Construction Industry 
  Perhaps the longest standing labor-management joint relationship in the U.S. is in 
the electrical contracting industry, between the International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers (IBEW) and the National Electrical Contractors Association (NECA). 
Composed of an equal number of representatives from the IBEW and NECA, the Council   14
on Industrial Relations was established in 1920 as a judicial body to handle labor-
management disputes in the electrical construction industry.  Disputes are submitted 
voluntarily, and all decisions are unanimous. The Council on Industrial Relations 
attempts to keep the industry free of strikes, serves as binding arbitrator for the industry, 
and meets to discuss safety and training matters.  NECA and the IBEW also jointly 
operate the National Joint Apprenticeship and Training Committee for the electrical 
industry. This program was established in 1947 as the national coordinating arm for 
apprenticeship training.  With a budget of approximately $80 million a year, it operates 
more than 300 local apprenticeship training programs as well as in-service skill 
improvement training for electricians. 
  Building on these experiences with joint programs, NECA and the IBEW 
responded to competition from nonunion electrical contractors by establishing the 
National Labor Management Cooperation Committee (NLMCC) in 1995. In addition to 
more traditional functions, such as promoting mutual gains bargaining, the NLMCC 
functions as a strategic partnership between the thousands of union electrical contractors 
associated with NECA and the IBEW, which represents more than 300,000 electrical 
construction workers. About 4,200 electrical contractors are members of NECA and 
nearly 12,000 other union electrical contractors are “signatory” contractors who have 
indicated that they would like to be covered by the NECA contract. The NLMCC is 
funded at one cent per person-hour worked, or at about $3.5 million per year. 
  Five years ago, in the context of its “Blueprint for the 90s,” the NLMCC 
developed a “market recovery program” to take back market share from the vast number 
of small, nonunion contractors in the construction industry.  Local NECA and IBEW   15
groups work together to administer surveys to determine how much construction work is 
carried out by union contractors and union workers, and to develop programs for 
increasing the share of union work; the NLMCC helps to finance and conduct the 
surveys.  
The program also includes joint campaigns to increase the number of apprentices, 
to create pride in the industry and union, and, especially, to promote the advantages of 
using union contractors.  NECA and the IBEW jointly advertise union contractors and 
jointly hire sales people to market union contractors to builders and architects.  
Advertising emphasizes the skills and versatility of union electricians and the pride they 
take in doing their jobs well. “Quality Connection,” an industry magazine published by 
the NLMCC, also supports this effort. 
  The IBEW described the market recovery program and the NLMCC as successful 
partnerships, noting that the number of union apprentices in the industry rose from 
25,000 to 40,000 in the last half of the 1990s. Further, in 1987 only about 28 percent of 
the electrical construction market was unionized. By 1999, according to IBEW, the 
market share of union contractors had risen to 37 percent of workers in the electrical 
construction industry. 
The Workplace of the Future in Telecommunications 
Concerns over market share and jobs also drove unions to seek strategic 
engagement in the telecommunications industry.  One example comes from AT&T, 
where the loss of monopoly protection in 1984 and the break-up of the Bell System led to 
a dramatic decline in union jobs. AT&T eliminated over 60 percent of its unionized   16
workforce between 1984 and 1992, while the regional Bell companies reduced the 
number of employees by about 30 percent through attrition (Batt, Katz, and Keefe 1999).   
More than 100,000 CWA jobs were lost, and union leadership came to believe 
that traditional collective bargaining was limited in its ability to prevent further job 
losses. The smaller IBEW presence was also weakened: all IBEW jobs in some units, 
such as sales, were lost.  The unions were concerned not only about the effects of 
restructuring on their membership, but about their own institutional security. In 1991, 
after acquiring NCR, a company that had aggressively used plant closures and other 
policies to avoid unionization, AT&T allowed NCR to go forward with a full range of 
anti-union tactics. This occurred simultaneously with discussions AT&T had begun with 
CWA about a code of conduct that would commit both the company and union to non-
hostile behaviors during union organizing drives (Nissen 1998). 
On the management side, AT&T came to believe it would be able to compete 
more successfully if its union relationships were cooperative rather than adversarial. The 
company hoped that more cooperative relations with its unions would help it to expand 
its market share: unionized workers were heavily involved in customer service, and the 
company found it difficult, in a competitive environment, to gain new business and to 
retain customers while engaging in adversarial relationships with these workers and their 
representatives.  
  The partnership model negotiated between AT&T and its unions, CWA and the 
IBEW, known as the Workplace of the Future, was intended to help all parties move from 
an adversarial to a more cooperative relationship.  The partnership was kicked off in 
March 1993.  The agreement states that “[t]he parties share the goals of establishing a   17
world class, high performance organization and protecting employment security through 
market success,” and recognizes that market success will require the company to target 
customer satisfaction and market flexibility (CWA 1993).  Further, the agreement 
recognized that “[j]oint training, jointly designed, will be essential to develop common 
understandings, describe business strategies, and develop union expertise in new 
technology” (CWA 1993). 
  The partnership structure of the Workplace of the Future had four components. 
Workplace models, to be jointly defined by the company and its unions, were charged 
with identifying and managing the implementation of workplace practices that enhance 
quality, customer satisfaction, quality of work life, and competitiveness. Business 
Unit/Division planning councils were intended to facilitate participation by the unions in 
business decisions regarding technology, work organization, job content, training, and 
employment and in the development of cooperative work and leadership styles.  The 
Constructive Relationship Council, established through bargaining in 1989, would 
continue to function and would facilitate the work of the Workplace Models and Business 
Unit/Division Planning Councils. Finally, a Human Resources Board, consisting of three 
AT&T executives, one union leader each from the CWA and IBEW, and two 
distinguished leaders in the field of human resources, was established. The Human 
Resource Board was to address “broad, strategic, global human resources and business 
issues within the context of the external environment over long range time frames” 
(CWA 1993). 
  The various partnership structures called for in the Workplace of the Future 
agreement have provided the unions and workers with increased opportunities for   18
participation, but the record has been uneven. The joint committees have not met the 
unions’ expectations. The top level Human Resources Board has provided only limited 
opportunities for union participation in strategic decisions. It functions mainly as a means 
for the unions to obtain information from AT&T. 
The record of the partnership in promoting greater security for the workforce and 
for the union has also been mixed. Employment security language remains weak, and 
restructuring continues to cause great insecurity for workers.  This problem has been 
especially acute for IBEW; CWA has had more opportunities to try to save jobs by 
suggesting alternatives to the company, or to mitigate the effects of downsizing on 
workers.  The company, however, has not always accepted the unions’ job-saving 
recommendations. 
The partnership has been further strained by the unions’ perception that AT&T is 
hostile to the unions’ institutional interests.  For example, when CWA successfully 
organized a majority of the potential members at AT&T’s American Transtech to sign 
union cards, the company backed down on its neutrality pledge, embarking on an anti-
union campaign. The union lost the 1995 representation election. More recently, the 
company has been buying into parts of the telecommunications industry that are 
nonunion, and resisting the unions’ attempts to organize these workers.  For example, 
AT&T acquired TCI and Media One in order to get into the cable business, but these 
acquisitions were not discussed in the partnership.  The long-term prospects of the 
partnership, in CWA’s view, depend largely on whether AT&T agrees to neutrality when 
the unions undertake organizing drives to represent workers in its cable operations. 
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New Directions Bargaining in Steel 
  In the decade following the 1982 collapse of steel production in the U.S., 
integrated steel mills were idled, employment fell, and wage and benefit concessions led 
to sharp declines in real compensation for steelworkers. In 1992, the USWA adopted its 
New Directions bargaining program, seeking “an ongoing voice for itself and its 
members in managerial decisions affecting shop-floor, plant, and corporate performance, 
all with an eye toward producing business success sufficiently sustained and shared as to 
serve both company and worker interests on a continuing basis.” (Frankel 1997:3). The 
program, according to USWA President George Becker, calls for “employment security 
guarantees and partnership agreements providing for union and worker involvement at 
every level from a seat on the Board of Directors to problem-solving on the shop floor.” 
(Becker 1998: 120).  
Building on its 1986 partnership agreement with National Steel, the USWA 
introduced New Directions bargaining in the 1993-94 round of contract negotiations. The 
main provisions of the New Directions program include a no layoff guarantee; union 
involvement in workplace and corporate decision making; restructuring the work place to 
increase flexibility, improve productivity, and reduce costs; and neutrality and card check 
recognition when the union seeks to organize nonrepresented employees (Frankel 1997). 
The program also included a strategic alliance between the company and the union with 
respect to public policy and joint company and union responses to industry trends. The 
union successfully negotiated contracts that included these partnership provisions with 
the major integrated steel companies – Inland, National, Bethlehem, USX, and LTV. 
Contracts with other companies, including Wheeling-Pittsburgh, Republic Engineered   20
Steels, USS/Kobe, Acme, J&L Specialty, Lukens Steel, Gulf States, and Northwestern 
Steel and Wire, contained many of the substantive features of the New Directions 
program. The agreements were for 6 years, and have been renegotiated since August 1, 
1999. Partnership agreements remain an important part of the unions’ bargaining agenda, 
and have been renegotiated with the major integrated steel companies. 
The partnership agreement provides the union with the right to participate, along 
with company managers, in decisions at levels of the company.  At the corporate level, 
joint strategic partnership committees bring union leaders and company executives 
together to consider strategic plans, technological change, staffing levels, customer 
evaluations, major organizational issues, and facilities utilization.  The agreements also 
include mechanisms by which union and plant officials can negotiate over instituting 
modern work practices, plant steering committees investigate alternative approaches to 
safety, work redesign, work assignments and scheduling, planning for technological 
change, training, and process improvement.  
The New Directions Bargaining Pattern contains provisions that require the steel 
companies to remain neutral when the USWA seeks to organize their nonrepresented 
employees and, in most cases, to recognize the union once a majority of workers has 
signed union cards.  The strength of these provisions was tested quickly after their 
adoption: in the 1993-94 contracts, such provisions covered only those affiliates in which 
the steel company directly or indirectly owned more than 50 percent of the voting power. 
LTV subsequently took exactly a 50 percent stake in a mini-mill in Gadsden, Alabama – 
in the union’s view, to evade the neutrality provisions – and the USWA put the 
partnership it had negotiated with the company in 1993 on hold. Both workers and the   21
union refused to participate in problem solving and decision making activities. In the 
1999 bargaining round, the neutrality provisions were extended to cover any entity in 
which the steel company owns a material interest and whose business involves steel raw 
materials or steel production and distribution. LTV agreed to accept these provisions and 
to withdraw from its joint venture in the Alabama steel mill if its partners refused to 
remain neutral during a USWA organizing drive.  
The acquiescence of LTV to the neutrality provisions suggests that the withdrawal 
of the workers and union from involvement in decision making and from cooperation in 
plant committees had consequences for performance at LTV’s integrated mills.  More 
generally, Appelbaum and Berg (2000) report that the partnership program of the USWA 
played an important role in increasing the legitimacy of worker involvement on the shop 
floor from the perspectives of both workers and managers, observing that employment 
security provisions assure individual workers that they will not work themselves out of a 
job if they use their capacities to innovate to contribute to increased productivity. The 
new workplace practices, these authors show, were associated with significantly higher 
productivity, and contributed heavily to the return to profitability of the integrated mills 
and to the turnaround in the steel industry.  
  The extent to which these partnership agreements have been implemented by 
union and management officials varies widely, as does the extent to which union officials 
participate in strategic decisions at the corporate level. Some local unions and managers 
have been able to use the partnership agreement to engage in mutual gains bargaining, 
but other facilities have experienced resistance from union officials or local managers to 
the basic elements of cooperation and partnership.  Both union officials and managers   22
express skepticism about whether the New Directions partnerships in steel live up to 
expectations about union participation in top-level strategic decisions. But the 
partnerships have proven valuable to both steel companies and the USWA as a means to 
modernize workplace practices, improve the economic viability of the integrated steel 
mills and the strength of the union as an institution, and preserve or expand union jobs in 
the industry.  
 
High Performance Work Organization Partnerships  
The International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAMAW) 
has successfully launched HPWO Partnerships or is far along in the process at 
approximately 50 (out of several thousand) of the facilities at which it represents workers. 
Union locals and managers at a far larger number of work sites have taken some early 
steps toward developing a partnership.  Some of the best known partnerships are being 
developed at leading companies such as Harley Davidson or Weyerhauser, but 
partnerships have also been established at small or medium-sized companies, often 
family-owned.  The union intends the HPWO Partnerships to enhance employers’ 
competitive position and thus its members’ job security and welfare. Partnerships have 
been developed with companies that wanted to increase market share in the face of 
intense competition, as well as with those facing severe financial or competitive problems 
that pose a threat to their survival. 
IAMAW observes that partnerships must begin with the commitment of 
management to growth; this commitment enables the union’s joint participation in 
developing and implementing a strategy and business plan to achieve that growth. In the   23
view of the union, if all management and the union do “is increase productivity and 
efficiency and do not develop strategies to stabilize and grow the business and get control 
of costs, employees may improve their way out of employment” (International 
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers 1999: 8-1).  IAMAW identifies three 
components of a successful partnership: a business plan that incorporates long-term 
returns, market expansion, and growth of the workforce; accurate costing out of all the 
activities that support production of the products and services the firm offers in the 
market place; and changes in the work process that improve quality and productivity. 
Partnership agreements establish a governance structure at the corporate or 
establishment level to provide leadership and guide the development of a growth strategy. 
The corporate partnership committee at Harley Davidson, for example, comprises four 
union and two company representatives. In an ideal partnership, a jointly developed 
strategic plan charts the future of the business.  Only after the union and management 
have agreed on a growth strategy and an appropriate system for costing activities will the 
union agree to assess work processes jointly and to propose improvements. The 
introduction of high performance workplace practices follows, rather than precedes, the 
development of the partnership. Extensive education, training and planning go into 
developing HPWO Partnerships. Several years may elapse between the time the union 
and company agree to explore a partnership relationship and the time an agreement is 
implemented. 
Partnership structures also include decision making bodies at the workplace, such 
as business unit or plant-level teams, that determine appropriate measures to track 
performance and make decisions about work processes and implements changes,   24
including the adoption of just-in-time inventory, self-directed work groups, cellular 
manufacturing, and so on. Shop stewards meet on a daily basis with their salaried 
counterparts, and natural work groups gather and share information, analyze problems 
and engage in problem solving activities, and make daily operational decisions. 
(International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers 1999). To assist its local 
unions in this process, the IAMAW also has a five-person department  that provides 
consulting and training and seven field staff that provide support services; particularly in 
smaller companies, top managers have welcomed advice on business process 
improvement and the development of alternative products and workplace practices.  
In addition to the commitment to growth and the establishment of joint decision-
making structures, the IAMAW has several other aims for its high performance work 
organizations. These include agreement on employment security, development of an 
education and communication plan for all employees, and an implementation plan for 
replacing traditional top down decision making by managers with joint decision making 
by labor and management at the appropriate levels of the organization.  The union 
expects to be “recognized as a valued and trusted partner by management.” At the same 
time, “the institutional support and protection provided by the union for the Partnership 
helps employees accept new roles and explore new work methods” (IAMAW 1999: 6-5). 
Many of the HPWOs have been established under difficult competitive 
circumstances, in firms and plants that have the inefficiencies typical of older 
manufacturing systems. The trying circumstances have provided a motivation for 
cooperation, but have also made it difficult to establish trust, develop joint governance 
and decision-making structures, or to make fundamental changes in work processes.   25
Obstacles to successful partnerships include the difficulty of taking on new roles for 
managers, professionals, other salaried employees, union leaders, and workers. For 
example, engineers and supervisors may fear that they have much to lose from the 
Partnerships, and may be reluctant to participate in the process.  Further, under 
competitive duress, managers experience more pressure to turn to layoffs, and the union 
may interpret consideration of such options as less than trustworthy. Shop floor 
frustration with the pace of change or skepticism about management’s motives can lead 
to rejection of union leaders, or of contracts that include partnership agreements.  
Yet a partnership that provides a commitment by management and the union to 
jointly developing a proactive approach to addressing competitive pressures may be the 
key both to survival for the company and to employment security for workers. The 
partnership may also increase the union’s strength as it comes to be seen by its members 
as providing real leadership to ensure the employer’s long-term survival and growth, 
thereby preserving jobs. 
 
Union Representatives on Corporate Boards of Directors 
  Our reviews and descriptions of partnerships are consistent with the finding that 
fewer than 3% of major collective bargaining agreements feature these arrangements: full 
partnerships appear to be extremely difficult for unions to establish and maintain.  
American unions have no statutory support for strategic involvement, and few firms have 
actively sought the involvement of union leaders at this level. The construction of these 
forums has required unusual circumstances, strong common interests in surviving in 
difficult competitive environments, and determined union leadership.   26
  Negotiated strategic partnerships occupy precarious ground.  They are vulnerable 
to collapse where union members are skeptical of the value of such involvement. Their 
survival and effectiveness also depend heavily on management commitment to the 
partnership, since information sharing and joint decision-making are integral parts of 
strategic involvement. What is less clear is whether unions can force such commitment 
upon management given sufficient bargaining power, or whether commitment depends in 
part on the good faith of management. 
Several American unions, aware of the tenuous nature of negotiated partnerships, 
have sought to bolster their strategic influence further by seeking seats on the boards of 
directors of companies where they represent members. Board seats could be particularly 
valuable in strategic partnerships because directorships come with statutory rights to 
information and involvement in decisions.  Such seats have emerged as a target of 
collective bargaining in programs such as the USWA’s New Directions and the 
IAMAW’s HPWO. 
Board seats for unions are not always coupled with other joint approaches or a 
commitment to partnership in decision-making.  Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, union-
nominated directors resulted chiefly from negotiations over ownership for workers 
through the institution of Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) (Hunter 1998). 
Protection of the workers’ ownership interests, rather than an increased commitment to 
shared strategic decision-making, motivated union leaders to seek board representation in 
many of these cases.  
  At least three factors constrain union-nominated directors’ abilities to use the 
board as a forum for discussions of management and union interests in strategic   27
decisions. First, union nominees, like all directors on American corporate boards, are 
required to represent the interests of shareholders (for a more complete description of this 
responsibility, see Johnson, Daily, and Ellsrand 1996), and are legally liable should they 
fail to do so effectively. Their fiduciary duties typically proscribe directors from explicit 
representation of union interests on boards, except where they can argue that meeting 
union interests is consistent with protecting shareholders’ investments in the firm. 
A second constraint on interest representation in the boardroom is normative: the  
view of the proper role of corporate boards that pervades American managerial and 
directors’ communities. On typical boards, outside directors -- those not part of the 
executive team -- rarely involve themselves with issues of day-to-day governance.  Only 
major events such as takeovers or changes in top executives bring forth outside director 
activism (Useem 1993). Board functioning in less dramatic circumstances relies on 
consensus rather than constituency representation or explicit negotiation among 
competing interests. 
Third, managers’ interests are not always aligned with those of the firms’ 
shareholders, and managerial opposition to shared control can derail strategic 
engagement even in when it is to the benefit of shareholders.  Here the experiences of the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) with board nominees are especially 
instructive. Following deregulation and the weakening of pattern bargaining in the 1980s.  
trucking companies sought wage concessions. In several firms, workers accepted stock in 
return for wage concessions; the IBT insisted on board seats to accompany the stock 
plans.  Several of the Teamster-nominated directors envisioned these seats as vehicles to 
foster joint discussion of the strategic issues facing the firm and union, but this never    28
developed. Instead, the boards became the venues through which the IBT attempted to 
protect its members’ financial investments as the firms struggled.  The managers guarded 
information closely and made as many decisions as possible outside the boardroom.  
Most of the IBT boards were characterized by considerable mistrust between outside 
directors and inside managers: one Teamster-nominated director actually sued the  
managers of his firm.  All of the Teamster board schemes eventually disappeared as the 
firms were acquired or went bankrupt in the fierce competition that followed 
deregulation. 
Awareness of the legal, normative, and practical constraints has dimmed union 
enthusiasm in board representation as a forum for strategic engagement. Chrysler, for 
example, was the first large American company to have a union representative on its 
board, with UAW President Douglas Fraser obtaining a seat following the concessions 
associated with Chrysler’s near bankruptcy in 1980. In 1984, after some wrangling, 
Fraser’s successor as President, Owen Bieber, assumed the seat. The Chrysler-UAW seat 
illustrated the limits of board representation: both Fraser and Bieber found it difficult to 
influence management policy in this venue. After several years, the UAW did not 
emphasize preservation of the board seat as a bargaining objective.  The corporation 
restructured its board, dropping Bieber, in 1991. 
Nevertheless, experiments with board representation continue. Table 1 lists 
American firms in which union representatives have recently served on corporate boards 
of directors.  Typically, these boards have one or more directors, but fewer than a 
majority, nominated by a union; the board seats are written into either the collective 
bargaining contract or, where backed by share ownership, the ESOP agreement.   With   29
the exception of the airlines, the firms have directors representing members of only one 
union; airline boards comprise members of both the Airline Pilots’ Association (ALPA) 
and the IAMAW. In addition to the American firms listed in Table 1, the United Auto 
Workers are represented on the 20-person supervisory board of directors of at the 
German company Daimler-Chrysler. Under German law, the unions that represent 
Daimler-Chrysler workers in Germany are entitled to three seats; the German union IG 
Metall has allowed the current UAW President to assume one of these three seats. 
Though union officials (including presidents of international unions such as 
Bieber and Fraser) have held directorships, union board representation does not require 
the directors to be active unionists or workers. The IAMAW, for example, discourages 
active union leaders from serving on boards; among its representatives are a number of 
retired union officials. Another common approach is the nomination of friendly 
“neutrals” – consultants, lawyers, even college professors – to serve as directors. Some of 
these union-nominated directors have been effective in improving firm governance in the 
interests of shareholders (Hunter 1998). Many union-nominated directors have the 
characteristics that corporate governance theorists claim make directors effective: a 
strong interest in the well-being of the company; sources of information; independence 
from management; and ties to important stakeholders (Baker and Patton 1987).  Union 
nominees with the right skills, commitment, and support can be as effective contributors 
to governance as any other outside director. 
A few of the boards of companies in Table 1 have established themselves as 
forums that reinforce or enhance strategic partnerships between labor and management. 
Most typically, this occurs when both parties are committed to the success of the schemes   30
in ways similar to those detailed in other kinds of strategic partnerships: the board seats 
are seen by the parties as part of a broader approach to labor-management cooperation, 
and the parties have strong reasons for cooperation rooted in the demands of the 
competitive market. Wever’s (1989) case study of the Western Airlines board, for 
example, showed that board participation was stronger when accompanied by further 
forms of employee involvement , and that all these forms of involvement were stronger 
when unions were more powerful and secure. As with other partnerships, the institutional 
security of the union, and the perception of the union that management will not (or is not 
powerful enough to) undermine that security, are important prerequisites for success.  
Despite the legal, normative, and practical constraints, union-nominated directors 
have had influence on strategic decision-making in a number of areas.  Cagy or 
experienced directors can turn the consensus-seeking environment in their favor, stalling 
or delaying decisions by withholding approval, for example. Union-nominated directors 
may diminish the likelihood that managers will seek to implement plans that will be 
perceived by the unions as divisive or destructive. Typically, they can do so by using 
their board positions to raise issues for discussion, and by requiring managers to address 
the argument that plans that provoke union opposition may be bad for the company (and 
its shareholders) in the long term. 
Directors also affect the selection and compensation of top executives. Union 
nominees can push to hire managers who are relatively more committed to partnership 
and to protecting the institutional interests of the union, for example, and may be able to 
stall or block the appointments of managers that they believe would be hostile.  Directors 
can also ensure that executive pay packages are established (and explained to the   31
workforce) in ways consistent with the preservation of partnership, rather than in ways 
that breed distrust or discontent. 
Board members can also be helpful in preserving a role for collective bargaining 
while placing it in strategic context. While bargaining is required over the distribution of 
returns, the presence of union representatives on boards can help both sides to make their 
positions credible to the others: books are relatively more open, for example, and 
directors can establish additional channels for communication. More generally, the 
presence of union-nominated directors adds additional credibility to strategic planning,  
while providing another route through which workforce and union concerns can be 
incorporated into decisions that affect the future of the company. 
While board representation can facilitate aspects of partnership, such as 
information sharing, it is clear that such representation provides no guarantees that the 
parties will work together to address joint concerns amicably. In addition to the 
difficulties at Chrysler and the problems the Teamsters had, other well-publicized fiascos 
with union board seats have included the Rath Packing Company (Hammer and Stern 
1986), Hyatt-Clark (Labor Research Review 1985), and Eastern Airlines (Smaby 1988). 
United Airlines provides a recent example of the challenges that union-nominated 
directorships face. ALPA and the IAM obtained one seat each on the board of directors, 
along with share ownership, in 1994.  (The flight attendants did not join in the plan, 
though non-union employees also took partial ownership and one board seat.)  Directors 
have struggled since then to establish their roles. As do all directors, the union nominees 
owed fiduciary responsibilities to all shareholders. Yet they owed their seats, and their 
loyalties, to the unions that had nominated them. On the board, directors formally   32
represented employees’ ownership interests. In practice the distinction between these 
interests, the interests of employees in their jobs, wages, and working conditions, and the 
interests of the unions as institutions tended to get tangled up. 
Following the employee buyout, board representation did not emerge as a catalyst 
for further cooperative approaches to labor-management relations. Over time, the 
likelihood that an effective partnership would be established diminished as trust between 
top managers and the union eroded. A difficult round of bargaining in 1997 was followed 
by a dispute over the IAM’s organizing of passenger service agents. An on again–off 
again proposal for a merger with USAirways provided further controversy. Eventually, 
the difficulties in the relationship began to have detrimental effects on company 
performance. In summer 2000 pilots were accused of engaging in work slowdowns 
(pilots’ spokesmen denied the accusations), and the bargaining between United and the 
IAM that continued through summer 2001 was bitter even by industry standards. The 
airline’s performance did not improved relative to its competitors after the buyout 
(Gittell, von Nordenflycht, and Kochan 2001), and none of the parties saw the ESOP as a 
success story. 
  
Concluding remarks: dilemmas for unions 
  Strategic partnerships in the U.S. seem unlikely to evolve naturally from other 
kinds of partnerships or employee involvement programs. Managers will continue to seek 
employee involvement in the workplace, should they believe it will enhance 
performance, but are less likely to bring unions into the executive suite.  Public policy 
developments that would mandate, or even encourage, strategic partnerships between   33
unions and management also seem exceedingly unlikely.  We therefore conclude this 
chapter with remarks that focus on the dilemmas that strategic partnerships raise for 
unions and their leaders, for the development of this new institution depends primarily on 
union initiative, and the extent to which unions find ways to address these challenges. 
There are at least three kinds of orientations that unions have brought to strategic 
partnerships. The first is limited: where workers have invested in the firm through stock 
purchases and ESOPs, unions can negotiate for ways to monitor managers more carefully 
from an investor’s point of view.  Second, partnerships can be primarily defensive, 
focused on company growth or stability and on the corresponding preservation of union 
jobs. Growth and security have provided premises underlying both successful and 
unsuccessful partnerships. Third, the partnership may be part of an overall attempt by the 
union to involve itself more deeply in the management of the firm, in which the union 
seeks venues through which its own expertise and that of its members can be deployed in 
ways that promote firm performance.  
  Participation presents a set of dilemmas to unions at the local level (Frost 2000), 
with the commitment of local workforce representatives to programs for labor-
management participation greatly enhancing the chances for success of such efforts. Such 
commitment, however, requires local unionists to reinterpret and redefine their roles, and 
to convince their members of the value associated with cooperation (Kochan 1985). 
Strategic participation from any orientation, whether exercised through negotiated 
partnerships or through board seats, raises challenges that may be more difficult for 
unions to address.  Problems with participation are intensified because the stakes are 
high.  By definition, the issues taken up at the strategic level may profoundly affect job   34
security, and the future survival of the firm and the union. Historically, union leaders 
have been averse to accepting even partial responsibility for managerial decisions without 
corresponding authority or influence, and they remain skeptical that partnerships will 
provide true influence. Successful strategic partnerships therefore require unions to assess 
accurately the extent to which management is willing to participate, or can be forced to 
do so. 
  The primary rationale for union-management strategic partnerships is to promote 
the long-term competitive position of the firm in directions consistent with protection of 
the workers’ investments in the firm, whether in financial or in human capital. In some 
environments, the parties may not have enough common interests to make partnership 
viable. As Heckscher and Shurman (1997) note, a potentially “fatal problem” with 
partnerships is that they cannot address the turbulence outside the firm that seems to be 
endemic to the current economy. 
To gain workers’ support, strategic partnerships must protect not only workers’ 
investments, but the institutional security of the union itself. Union leaders are likely to 
see any purported benefits of partnership as vacuous in the presence of threats to the 
continued vitality of labor representation for the firms’ workers.  One promising area for 
further investigation is the relationship between union organizing and strategic 
partnerships. Through strategic partnerships, unions have sought to establish conditions 
of neutrality toward further organizing and toward treatment of acquisitions.  Where 
partnerships have floundered, on the other hand, it is often because the unions have been 
unable to forge this kind of arrangement.  Keeping union jobs inside the firm rather than 
outsourcing the may be a similar precondition for success.   35
Even where the parties have enough common interests to warrant cooperation, 
further factors also mitigate against the success of strategic partnerships. Among these 
factors are mismatches between union structure and the demands of partnerships, and the 
failure of partnerships to include all relevant parties (Hecksher and Shurman 1997). 
Strategic participation and partnerships raise dilemmas for the union as an institution, at 
levels above that of the local, the bargaining unit, or the company.  Effectiveness of 
strategic partnerships, whether through negotiated agreements or in the boardroom, can 
be greatly enhanced by the support and involvement of the international union. The 
cooperation of the international can provide directors and local leaders in partnerships 
with access to information and expertise, and international unions have the resources to 
train and guide local leaders. 
  International unions, however, are also charged with setting industry frameworks 
for bargaining, and with establishment of common standards and principles. This creates 
problems for the international with respect to strategic participation. As one union leader 
remarked,  
“When I talk about a conflict of interest I'm not really talking about the 
simple union-management problem. The issue is really single enterprise 
loyalty.  I don't want me or the [international] union to be in a position of 
playing God, to be picking winners in the industry” (quoted in Hunter, 
1998). 
 
Strategic engagement and partnerships, however, may push international unions in the 
direction of favoring some members’ interests over others, precisely because such 
institutions are intended to confront competitive issues.  Strategic decisions that help one 
firm may harm another; a dilemma for international union leaders is to establish 
principles for support of partnerships that will enable them to avoid being caught up in   36
such intra-industry competition.  Internationals, and hence partnerships, are more likely 
to be effective where circumstances permit the partnership to focus on competitive 
challenges that do not raise such internal problems for the union (for example, attacking 
the non-union sector in electrical contracting). 
  Strategic partnerships may also require the commitment of substantial union 
resources, both to the achievement of the partnership (since management is often 
opposed), and to its support and maintenance. With the benefits of strategic engagement 
unclear, unions may be reluctant to provide the required levels of support; few unions 
besides the USWA and ALPA, for example, have identified strategic partnerships as an 
objective of collective bargaining, and the USWA is currently reassessing the prominence 
it has assigned to this goal. Within the CWA, similarly, the future of partnerships is being 
debated, with skeptics questioning the commitment of the union’s time and resources to 
participation at the expense of activities such as organizing. 
  Union-management strategic partnerships also may exclude from the discussion 
parties that are necessary to the long-term success of the firm (Heckscher and Shurman 
1997). For example, inside the firm, middle managers and supervisors may go 
unrepresented, yet their reactions may strongly affect the success of strategic initiatives 
or the introduction of new work systems. Further, partnerships must be matched to the 
appropriate level of organizational decision-making: corporate-level partnerships may be 
ineffectual in a highly decentralized management structure, for example, while effective 
division- or plant-level partnerships may be undone with a single decision made at 
corporate headquarters should the union find the decision objectionable.   37
  Table 2 brings together in summary form a range of choices available to unions in 
the design of these institutions. The choices union leaders make will depend on a number 
of factors: internal union politics and structure; the particular features of the competitive 
markets in which the firms seek to compete (the extent of unionization, global 
competition, or competition on the basis of price, for example); the bargaining power of 
the union at the local and international levels; and the relationship and history union 
leaders have with local and corporate-level management. 
  These choices, for now, will be made in a legal environment that is fits union-
management partnerships poorly. Generally, American labor laws provide relatively 
weak protections of workers’ rights to organize. Even in unionized firms, managers 
typically oppose vigorously any attempts to extend union representation, and seek 
opportunities to move work from union to non-union environments.  Union involvement 
in strategic decision-making tends, therefore, to be concentrated on preserving 
membership. In the absence of such security, union leaders find it difficult to engage in 
the kinds of cooperation that would permit the parties to confront the kinds of threats to 
employees’ job security and earnings that could be addressed by joint efforts such as 
those directed toward training or the implementation of high-performance work practices. 
Little legal guidance exists on how partnerships should be conducted even where 
the parties find ways to establish them: on the extent to which union leaders might 
compromise their duty of fair representation to their members in the exercise of their 
fiduciary duties as board directors, for example, or how they might reconcile duties of 
representation with decisions made in the process of strategic planning.  Directors also 
enjoy little legal guidance on the extent to which they are allowed to share information   38
with the unions that nominate them to boards. Management lawyers tend to advise union 
nominees to share nothing, which is hardly consistent with the spirit of the arrangements.  
Anti-trust law governing interlocking directorates is also vague in its application to these 
contexts, and with respect to whether international unions can send representatives to 
multiple firms.  Further, the extent to which conflicts of interest requiring union 
nominated directors to remove themselves from discussions is debatable both in theory 
and practice. Several boards have considered, with different results, whether the presence 
of the union representatives in the boardroom is appropriate during discussions of 
collective bargaining strategy.  Negotiated partnerships, while less burdened by legal 
requirements than are directorships, operate in a legal vacuum. The further emergence of 
both these forms of partnership should be considered in the surrounding legal context, 
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TABLE 2 
CHOICES FACING UNION LEADERS IN THE DESIGN  















Does the international 
union advocate 
partnerships as a 
matter of policy? 
 
Does the union 
support board seats? 
 





What policy should 
the union demand of 
the company with 
respect to subsequent 
organizing 
campaigns?  





If management is 
reluctant to agree, 
how much is 
partnership worth?  
 




union operations be 
handled? 
Should workers buy 







What role should 
employment security 









leaders be permitted 






What criteria will 
be used to select 
representatives? 





Will the international 
union provide 
training and technical 
support for the 
representatives? 
Will the union 
attempt to 
coordinate with or 
instruct the 
representatives? 




union leaders, and local 
members? 
 
 
 